Bountiful City v. Jesse G. Palomino : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Bountiful City v. Jesse G. Palomino : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Russell L. Mahan; Attorney for Respondent.
Walter F. Bugden; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bountiful City v. Palomino, No. 880179 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/946
U T A H o o i m j - -
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
SO 
-A10
 K1^ 
POCKET NO. UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JESSE G. PALOMINO, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 880179-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment entered in the 
Fourth Circuit Court for Davis County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Mark S. Johnson 
Russell L. Mahan 
Bountiful City Prosecutor 
745 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorney for Respondent 
Walter F. Bugden, Jr. 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION: 
v i ' l f HI 
K* APR 22 1988 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TN THE UTAii I'" f\PN«:Ai,q 
Plaintiff /Respond'- .•. , 
u , 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No 8801^-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a »udgment entered in tn<; 
Fourth Circuit Court for Davis County, 
State of Uta:
 r the Honorable Mark c Tohnson 
257 Towers, Suite 340 
257 East 200 South - 10 
"
 nt Lake City, Utah 84111 
n^orney for Appellant 
R u s s e n L . mal lar l 
Bountiful City Prosecutor 
74 5 South Main 
Bountiful, Utan ot^<, 
a^nrnfiv for Respondent 
ARGUMENT PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION-
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 4 
POINT I AN ACCURATE INSTRUCTION UPON THE BASIC 
ELEMENTS OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
IS ESSENTIAL, AND THE FAILURE TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DEFINITION 
OF THE TERM "ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL" 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR 4 
CONCLUSION 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 7 
ADDENDUM 8 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
State v. Harmon, 712 P. 2d 219 (Utah 1986) 4, 5, 6 
State v. Laine, 618 P. 2d 33 (Utah 1980) 4, 5, 6 
ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Driving Under the 
Influence of an Alcoholic Beverage after a jury trial which was 
held on January 26, 1988, and the Judgment of Conviction, which 
was rendered against the Appellant on February 22, 1988, by the 
Honorable Mark S. Johnson, Fourth Circuit Court for Davis County. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether or not the failure of the Trial Court to 
instruct the jury on the definition of the term "actual physical 
control", an element of the offense charged, Driving Under the 
Influence of an Alcoholic Beverage, constitutes reversible error. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was charged by Information with driving or 
being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on November 
10, 1987. At the trial, no evidence was presented that any 
No transcript has been ordered or prepared for the Appeal. 
The parties have stipulated to an Agreed Statement As The Record 
On Appeal. All references herein are to the paragraphs in the 
Agreed Statement (hereinafter "A.S.") 
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police officer or other witness had seen the Appellant driving a 
motor vehicle on November 10/ 1987. The City did introduce 
testimony from Officer Jim Garner that he had observed the 
Appellant behind the wheel of an automobile at approximately 810 
East 500 South in Bountiful, Utah. Officer Garner testified that 
the vehicle was not moving, and that he never saw the Appellant 
actually driving said vehicle (A.S. 1, 2). Field sobriety tests 
were administered and the Appellant was arrested for Driving 
Under the Influence of an Alcoholic Beverage (A.S. 6). The 
Appellant refused to submit to a chemical test (A.S. 7). 
The Appellant testified on his own behalf. He testified 
that he drove to Wendover, Nevada, and on the return from 
Wendover, the Appellant admitted consuming two (2) beers. The 
Appellant also admitted that he had been the driver of the 
vehicle (A.S. 8). He further testified that he opened a beer 
after his vehicle ran out of gas. He stated that he drank about 
half of that beer prior to the time that Officer Garner arrived 
at the scene and observed the Appellant's motor vehicle stopped 
along the roadway (A.S. 9). 
After the Trial Court read all of the instructions to the 
jury, the City's attorney requested permission to approach the 
bench. At that time, the City's attorney requested that the 
Court include in the elements instruction to the jury that the 
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Appellant could be found guilty of the offense of Driving Under 
the Influence if the City proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the Appellant was either driving an automobile on November 10, 
1987, or that the Appellant was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle on the same date (A.S. 10). Appellant's counsel 
urged that it would be necessary to define the legal term of artf 
"actual physical control", in order for the jury to understand 
the elements of the offense (A.S. 11). The Trial Court 
instructed Appellant's counsel to prepare such an instruction. 
Appellant's counsel did prepare such an instruction and tendered 
it to the Court. The Court refused to give the instruction, and 
Appellant's counsel excepted to the Court's failure to give said 
instruction (A.S. 11). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The term "actual physical control" is a term of art, and is 
not self-explanatory. The Appellant was entitled to a basic 
"elements" instruction to the jury. The Trial Court's refusal to 
submit the proffered instruction to the jury, believing that the 
jury would understand the term "actual physical control", consti-
tuted reversible error. The jury was not instructed concerning 
the elements of the alleged crime, and therefore it cannot be 
determined whether or not the jury properly found each element of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
1
• AN ACCURATE INSTRUCTION UPON THE BASIC ELEMENTS 
OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE IS ESSENTIAL, 
AND THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
DEFINITION OF THE TERM "ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL" 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR, 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently ruled that an 
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the offense 
charged is essential, and the failure to so instruct constitutes 
reversible error. In State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980), 
the Supreme Court ruled that the failure of the Trial Judge to 
include the intent element in the basic "elements" instruction in 
a prosecution for theft by deception was reversible error. The 
Court reached this conclusion even though one of the instructions 
included the "Information" instruction which did refer to the 
intent required for the commission of the crime, but did "not 
inform the members of the jury that before returning the verdict, 
they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the 
conscious objective to withhold the property (automobile) per-
manently." Id. at 35. 
The Laine holding was reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court 
i n
 State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 219 (Utah 1986). The Harmon case 
presents a virtually identical factual scenario as that presented 
in the instant matter. There the defendant was charged by an 
Information with robbery, but at trial, the Court granted the 
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State's motion to instruct the jury on the lesser included 
offense of Attempted Robbery. In its instructions to the jury, 
however, the Court merely inserted the word "attempted" before 
the word "robbery" in the previously prepared instruction on the 
elements of robbery and then read that to the jury as the ele-
ments instruction for attempted robbery. The Court failed to 
instruct the jury on the specific definition of an attempt. 
In Harmon, the defendant, just as in the case at bar, 
objected to the Courtfs instruction and requested an instruction 
defining the word "attempt". The trial court refused the defen-
dant's proffered instruction, instead believing the jury would 
understand the word "attempt". Because the jury was not 
instructed concerning the elements of the crime for which the 
defendant was convicted, the Court citing State v. Laine, granted 
the defendant a new trial. 
In the instant matter, the failure of the Trial Court to 
define "actual physical control" constitutes reversible error 
because in the absence of such an instruction, it cannot be 
determined whether or not the jury properly found each element of 
the crime of Driving Under the Influence beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This is so because the jury could have logically 
concluded that the City had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Appellant was actually driving a motor vehicle while 
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under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. Although the 
Appellant did admit to drinking two beers during his drive from 
Wendover to Bountiful, a jury could have logically concluded that 
two beers consumed over several hours prior to the driving at 
issue was not a sufficient quantity of alcohol to appreciably 
impair the Appellant's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. 
Thus, if the jury concluded that it was appropriate to 
acquit the Appellant on the driving alternative of Driving Under 
the Influence, then the jury's verdict could only be supported if 
they concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant was 
in "actual physical control" of an operable motor vehicle. The 
Appellant did admit that he had consumed about one-half of a beer 
after his vehicle had run out of gas, and prior to the time that 
the arresting officer arrived at the scene. The jury could have 
concluded that even though the Appellant was not guilty under the 
drivinq alternative, that he was guilty under the actual physical 
control alternative since, by his own testimony, he had consumed 
two and a half beers by that point in time. Laine and Harmon 
mandate the granting of a new trial in the case at bar. Just as 
in Harmon, "actual physical control" is a term of art and is not 
self-explanatory. The Appellant is entitled to a basic 
"elements" instruction. Because the jury was left to guess at 
the meaning of "actual physical control", the Trial Court's 
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failure to instruct the jury on the basic elements was reversible 
error. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellant's conviction should be reversed and a new 
trial should be ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 1988. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN , JR., 
Attorney for Appellant 
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